Titanic tourist submersible missing.

[PHXPhlyer]

Who is there to sue? The main target is also dead, the company probably has very little in the way of assets.

His estate?

PP

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

It's a company, his estate isn't liable.
And in any case, the defence will be that the Canadian government allowed them to operate. And the Canadian government, like every government, isn't about to admit that its inspection procedures are dangerously laughable.
Ladbroke Grove train crash? Assorted US dams? Italian bridges?

[4mastacker]

The BBC has pictures of the wreckage being brought ashore. They comment that the plexiglass access dome is missing from one of the titanium rings - the point of failure?

Titan wreckage brought ashore

[OFSO]

I see they were at or near 12,000'. Wartime subs didn't go below 650'.

Yes I also had a good look at the debris. One end missing and the carbon fiber sheets appear to be not continuous. Poor people. Hope it was quick.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

The entire implosion would have happened about 500 times faster than the speed of signals in human nerves. They would have known nothing about it.

[OneHungLow]

The BBC has pictures of the wreckage being brought ashore. They comment that the plexiglass access dome is missing from one of the titanium rings - the point of failure?

Titan wreckage brought ashore

Highly likely. The company refused to pay for certification of that plexiglass porthole to 4000 metres and the component in use had only been certified to 2000 metres.

Correction 1300 metres...

Lochridge had alleged major safety issues: there had been almost no unmanned testing of the craft; the alarm system would only sound off “milliseconds” before an implosion; and the porthole was only certified to withstand pressure of 1,300 meters, even though OceanGate planned to take the submersible 4,000 meters underwater.

[Archer]

One end missing and the carbon fiber sheets appear to be not continuous. Poor people. Hope it was quick.

I'm pretty sure that the sheets seen in that footage are just an outer shell and not part of the pressure hull. That cylinder was five inches thick and these bits are thin sheet. My guess is on the pressure hull collapsing being the first point of failure. The porthole may have departed from the titanium end cap during the implosion.

[OneHungLow]

One end missing and the carbon fiber sheets appear to be not continuous. Poor people. Hope it was quick.

I'm pretty sure that the sheets seen in that footage are just an outer shell and not part of the pressure hull. That cylinder was five inches thick and these bits are thin sheet. My guess is on the pressure hull collapsing being the first point of failure. The porthole may have departed from the titanium end cap during the implosion.

Given the implosion damage, fractures that led to the disintegration of the pressure hull etc. will it be possible to trace the sequence of failure to the root cause and locate the initial point that lost structural integrity? Root cause analysis 101 that will require complex analysis and stress modelling I suppose.

Meanwhile on the subject of legal liability etc.

But archaic maritime laws may afford OceanGate the possibility of escaping some culpability in the courts going forward — just as the White Star Line attempted to do after its prize ship, the RMS Titanic, hit an iceberg and sank 110 years ago.

Limitation of liability
“There’s entire sections of the federal code that are maritime law, and probably the most important one, for our purposes, is the 1851 Limitation Act,” Fordham Law School Professor Lawrence B. Brennan tells The Independent. “If you’re a defendant, and your car has an accident and damages property or kills somebody or injures them, you can't limit your liability. You either are exonerated, there’s an allocation of fault, or you pay the full damages. In Admiralty [maritime law], the shipowner defendant can start a proceeding where it chooses, within certain limits, and argues that it's not responsible for anything. And that goes back to the 1851 statute.”

At the time the legislation was brought in to avoid shipping company bankruptcies, Prof Brennan says, “there were no steel ships to speak of, and they were mostly steam ships, and there were a lot of fires — so a law that precedes the Lincoln administration causes some interesting litigation.”

An OceanGate petition under the act would “attempt to limit their liability to the post-casualty value of the vessel, which is zero,” he says of the imploded Titan. “Plus, in injury and death cases, a certain tonnage amount, which will be relatively small for the dead and injured.”

Prof Brennan continues: “It’s one of these bizarre things where the nominal defendant can commence an action. It’s more akin, intellectually, to a bankruptcy proceeding; it’s not procedurally akin, it’s a pure admiralty thing. One of the major cases in there, surprisingly, is the SS Titanic.”

He predicts that the company will argue: “We’re not liable, and if we’re liable, we exercised due diligence, and the standard in death cases is broader than property damage cases, and we owe no one anything.”

The 1851 legislation was amended just last year, however, in response to a 2019 small vessel fire in California — and legal action related to Titan’s demise may fall within the parameters of that new Small Passenger Vessel Liability Fairness Act, Tulane’s Prof Harowski, who is also a partner at law firm Wilson Elser’s New Orleans office in the Admirality & Maritime practice, tells The Independent.

“They changed the law to exempt small passenger vessels from the scope of the limitation of liability,” he says, adding that “there’s not much good law out there about small passenger submarines.

“I think there's a chance that this ... could fall within the scope of this act, so that OceanGate may not be able to limit their liability because of this new congressional amendment to the data.”

Nothing is certain, however, and he admits that the “Limitation Act is still very much in use, and there are some requirements for limiting the liability under it, namely that the owner of the vessel can't have any knowledge of the cause of the [tragedy] prior to [it].

“If evidence comes out that OceanGate knew of some design flaw or risks, and then went ahead with it anyway, that might prevent them from limiting their liability anyway, even if it wasn't exempt under the Small Vessel Liability Act.”

It has emerged that a 2018 lawsuit brought by OceanGate’s former director of marine operations accused the company of ignoring safety concerns — and questions have been raised about Titan’s design and material choices. Such concerns were repeatedly dismissed by OceanGate’s CEO Mr Rush.

Beyond the questions of seaworthiness and use of the Liability Act, there’s the issue of what the law might consider a submersible in the first place.

It’s unusual in that it, obviously, it's a submersible, and I'm not aware of any other similar instances involving submersible,” Prof Harowski says. “But, legally, I'm not sure that changes that drastically. It's still a vessel.”

That being said, there are no clear-cut precedents to look to here, and all of the uncertainties — particularly jurisdiction — will hugely affect what happens next.

“It’s a device; it’s obviously not a vessel to go on the surface of the water ... as I understand, the Titan itself was not registered with any country, so it was not flying any flag, and so it's kind of wide open,” University of Washington Professor Tom Schoenbaum, author of Schoenbaum’s Admiralty & Maritime Law, tells The Independent.

Criminal proceedings
Prof Schoenbaum says he thinks it “very unlikely” that criminal proceedings will arise — but draws a distinction between three different types of actions going forward.

“Number one would be the liability, actions filed by the estates of the passengers,” he says. “Number two, there's the regulatory aspect, whether the Titan broke any regulatory. And specifically, the US will be involved in that, because OceanGate is a Washington state company, headquartered in Everett, Washington.

“As far as US law is concerned, there's a requirement that a submersible — there's a 1993 act — that the Coast Guard says applies to submersibles capable of carrying one passenger. This obviously would qualify. And it requires certification by an industry standard group, and I don't think that this Titan had any certification, or maybe if they did they had a certification by a substandard certifying body.”

If certifications were found to be lacking, he says, the company would “certainly face fines” — and that’s separate from a third type of proceedings: Insurance probes.

The complicated and unprecedented circumstances mean that many questions remain about what can and will happen — and, importantly, which jurisdiction(s) consequences will be happening in.

“The investigation probably is going to be Coast Guard, National Transportation Safety Board ... the Justice Department will get involved if there’s criminal proceedings worth investigating,” he says, adding that officials could still “come up with a clean bill and say, you know, no one’s responsible.”

There is a long-shot possibility of state action, depending on the waters involved, and Prof Brennan names authorities in Canada, the US and maybe France as “the obvious probable investigating bodies”.

“Will they agree to do joint investigations or share it? I hope so,” he says. “It would be some efficiency and some cost savings ... I think that we’re going to have to have different authorities, and we’re going to have different authorities with different standards and different protection against self-incrimination and corporate liability, and we can have multiple proceedings and the same facts in different countries. Not going to surprise me.”

Depending upon the findings of any investigations, charges could include negligent “homicide. negligent preparation, operation of the vessel; people who are not properly licensed,” Prof Brennan says, cautioning: “I’m just giving you a checklist, not saying there’s anything there, of course.”

He predicts that any “trial is going to be a nightmare” while pointing out: “90 per cent of federal civil litigation, including admiralty cases, settle.”

Settlement possibility
He believes any case involving Titan will also settle “eventually, probably”.

“But it depends on what discovery shows,” he says. “And, the more facts that come out, and the more problems that can be argued, the harder it's going to be for the ship owner to settle. And if the [victim] estates have weak cases, are they going to take nominal settlements? And that's what it's going to come down to and ... we're going to deal with this for a long time.”

OceanGate did not respond to The Independent regarding whether it has petitioned under the 1851 Act, referring only to its earlier statements on the ordeal.

More than a century ago, however, the owners of Titanic were able to successfully limit their liability against claims under the act. However, they had to defend claims brought in the United Kingdom separately, Prof Harowski says, noting that the “UK applies a totally different legal regime for limitation of liability.”

And, as Prof Schoenbaum points out, much of OceanGate’s liability may rest with the content of the waivers signed by those on board.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/worl ... 65571.html

[Karearea]

...a 2019 small vessel fire in California ...

Fwiw, that vessel was the Conception, 34 killed, September 2, 2019

The owners of the boat in the California fire that killed 34 are employing a legal strategy described as 'heartless' that could limit payouts to $0

Wikipedia: Sinking of MV Conception - Legal

[barkingmad]

I presume he's referring to the adhesive texture (obviously smooth peanut butter, not the crunchy variety) and NOT to it's bonding qualities?



And this to follow;

https://www.aol.co.uk/news/oceangate-ce ... 35284.html

I won't be bidding for my ticket anytime soon, if at all...

[OneHungLow]

I presume he's referring to the adhesive texture (obviously smooth peanut butter, not the crunchy variety) and NOT to it's bonding qualities?

I won't be bidding for my ticket anytime soon, if at all...

The submersible, was perhaps, a bit like De Havilland aircraft that tended to become debonded after a while.

This guy, the CEO, was warned by multiple people. that the technology was not appropriate, and was not proven or certified at the depths the craft was going to operate at. I suspect hubris caused him to become somewhat unglued himself. By all accounts the submersible was a deathtrap.

This fact alone should have made any sane person who looked at the operation of the submersible walk away from it.

The submersible is locked from the outside, creating a death trap. In the ocean, getting lost is easy. The submersible has multiple mechanisms that can bring it to the surface, but reaching the surface is useless unless someone finds them and opens the lid. The available oxygen is limited and will only survive for about 96 hours. It's like a game where you'll die if someone cannot open the lid before the air runs out.

Design Decision/Tradeoff: In an environment like the ocean, there is a very high possibility of getting lost. Having a limited amount of oxygen and not adding a feature to open the pod from within is suicidal, even though the reason for the crash was not be related to this as it's said to be an implosion.

During the drama, this ex-Royal Naval Commander summed it up pretty well, although I guess he may have already known that the submersible had imploded, as most sophisticated navies operating in the the Atlantic already did, and the fact that it had imploded was almost an open secret!.

and the fact that it had imploded was almost an open secret!

[4mastacker]

Hardly sterile conditions for mixing the adhesive then joining the ring and the tube. I think Fred Dibnah would have called it "back street mechanicing" - thing is, Fred knew what he was doing.

[Archer]

There is a very good article in the New York Post, see here: https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-report ... -to-happen

[OneHungLow]

There is a very good article in the New York Post, see here: https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-report ... -to-happen

Well written synopsis. Thank you for posting that.

To assess the carbon-fibre hull, Lochridge examined a small cross-section of material. He found that it had “very visible signs of delamination and porosity”—it seemed possible that, after repeated dives, it would come apart. He shone a light at the sample from behind, and photographed beams streaming through splits in the midsection in a disturbing, irregular pattern. The only safe way to dive, Lochridge concluded, was to first carry out a full scan of the hull.

The next day, Lochridge sent his report to Rush, Nissen, and other members of the OceanGate leadership. “Verbal communication of the key items I have addressed in my attached document have been dismissed on several occasions, so I feel now I must make this report so there is an official record in place,” he wrote. “Until suitable corrective actions are in place and closed out, Cyclops 2 (Titan) should not be manned during any of the upcoming trials.”

Like his submersible, Stockton had come unglued... and completely underestimated the deadly warning in the silence of the strands...

OceanGate’s lawyer wrote, “The parties found themselves at an impasse—Mr. Lochridge was not, and specifically stated that he could not be made comfortable with OceanGate’s testing protocol, while Mr. Rush was unwilling to change the company’s plans.” The meeting ended in Lochridge’s firing.

Soon afterward, Rush asked OceanGate’s director of finance and administration whether she’d like to take over as chief submersible pilot. “It freaked me out that he would want me to be head pilot, since my background is in accounting,” she told me. She added that several of the engineers were in their late teens and early twenties, and were at one point being paid fifteen dollars an hour. Without Lochridge around, “I could not work for Stockton,” she said. “I did not trust him.” As soon as she was able to line up a new job, she quit.

“I would consider myself pretty ballsy when it comes to doing things that are dangerous, but that sub is an accident waiting to happen,” Lochridge wrote to McCallum, two weeks later. “There’s no way on earth you could have paid me to dive the thing.” Of Rush, he added, “I don’t want to be seen as a Tattle tale but I’m so worried he kills himself and others in the quest to boost his ego.”

[Pontius Navigator]

Death after the implosion may have been instantaneous but they may have had the full Hollywood in advance of failure: warping sounds, pinhole leak etc.

Finding a pin hole leak in a 3,000psi hydraulic leak with your finger would have your finger off. At 12,000 feet be a bit worrying and there might have been some warning grumbles "it's OK, it was like this on the last ............:

[OneHungLow]

Death after the implosion may have been instantaneous but they may have had the full Hollywood in advance of failure: warping sounds, pinhole leak etc.

Finding a pin hole leak in a 3,000psi hydraulic leak with your finger would have your finger off. At 12,000 feet be a bit worrying and there might have been some warning grumbles "it's OK, it was like this on the last ............:

In the James Cameron interview posted above, he notes he believes there was some forewarning of the coming disaster... It seems there is some evidence that they dropped the ballast (weights) to stop the dive before the craft imploded.

Cameron

"I think, if that's your idea of safety, then you're doing it wrong. They probably had warning that their hull was starting to delaminate and starting to crack.

"We understand from inside the community that they had dropped their descent weights and they were coming up to surface to try and manage the emergency."

https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/ ... c6b800cf11

[OneHungLow]

Nearly three weeks after its submersible vessel Titan imploded, killing all five people on board, OceanGate is reportedly suspending all exploration and commercial operations.

ABC News reported on Thursday that the organization would no longer be sending individuals down to the wreckage of the Titanic, or elsewhere. As of Thursday afternoon, the OceanGate website still advertised its expeditions.

Nobody in their right mind would trust any of their remaining submersibles anyway.

The ROV operator interview...

[OneHungLow]

Not sure how authentic this is but?

Supposed comms transcript...

https://www.indy100.com/news/titan-sub- ... 2662237857



I am apt to think that this a fake, not least because there are no fat finger errors in a very stressful situation. Moreover I imagine that the text system would have had codes for brevity, this transcript reads like a script.

[OneHungLow]

Another point of view on the so-called transcript



I am completely conflicted on this transcript.

[barkingmad]

We can certainly do without those nasty conspiracy theorists positing stories such as this which imply dirty deeds in high places;

https://www.dailydot.com/debug/hunter-b ... implosion/

But alas the tactic does have precedent, so maybe not so far-fetched after all;

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/arti ... -news.html

Or from even earlier in history;

https://www.politics.co.uk/news/2009/01 ... -bad-news/

And those of us in the UK, who have not dissolved their memory cells with copious/good alcohol, will remember Jo Moore, the special adviser who sent an email on September 11 suggesting it was a 'good day to bury bad news'.....